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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides the first evidence showing that ownership concentration and the identity 
of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of corporate earnings, measured by a stock 
price-based timeliness metric and the reporting lag. Using panel data of 1,276 Malaysian firms 
from 1996 to 2009, we find a non-linear relationship between concentrated ownership, 
measured by the largest shareholding in a firm, and the reporting lag but not the timeliness of 
price discovery. Although firms with government as the largest shareholder and political 
connections have a significantly shorter reporting lag, only the former are timelier in price 
discovery. Firms with family and foreigners as the largest shareholder however are less timely 
in price discovery. While the reporting lag is shorter in the period after the integration of the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) into Bursa listing rules, its impact on the 
timeliness of price discovery is mostly immaterial. 
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1. Introduction  
Research on the timeliness of corporate earnings can be traced back to the 1968 seminal paper 
by Ball and Brown, where they describe accounting income numbers in terms of “relevance” and 
“timeliness”. Timely disclosure of financial information can mitigate information asymmetry (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1999); prevent the opportunities for insider trading and misappropriation of 
corporate assets by managers (Leventis and Weetman, 2004); reduce the abuse by managers with 
privileged access to internal information (Scott, 1997); and lower the cost of capital (Euromoney 
Institutional Investor PLC, 2001). Timely disclosure can thus reduce the magnitude of periodic 
earnings surprises, which in turn, increases management credibility and reduces stock price volatility. 
It is therefore not surprising that regulatory agencies and listing authorities around the world,1 
including Malaysia, have established mandatory requirements regarding the timeliness of corporate 
disclosure of financial information.  
In this study, we examine how corporate ownership relates to the timeliness of earnings. 
Timeliness is measured by both the reporting lag and the speed of price discovery; the latter is 
defined as the speed at which value-relevant information is reflected in the stock price (Beekes and 
Brown, 2006). Specifically, we ask how the timeliness of earnings is shaped by ownership 
concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder. We conduct our tests in Malaysia where 
highly concentrated ownership and control through pyramiding and crossholdings is ubiquitous – a 
                                                          
1 For example, the European Commission recommends speedy dissemination of information to the market and 
prohibits private briefings and other forms of selective disclosure so that information can be made available to all 
investors at the same time. The US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) enforces a tiered system to annual reporting 
where small firms (with market capitalization less than USD75 million) are required to lodge their annual reports within 
90 days from the fiscal year-end, large firms (with market capitalization greater than USD700 million) within 60 days, 
and all other firms within 75 days. The reporting deadline is no later than 90 days from the end of the financial year for 
firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Timely disclosure also forms the basis of the Australian Stock Exchange, 
with a world-class technological platform (Company Announcement Platform, CAP) that enables listed companies to 
make simultaneous and rapid dissemination of disclosure. Even China has passed its first national Securities Law in 1998 
to protect the interest of investors by requiring listed companies to disclose information that is likely to influence the 
stock price. 
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salient feature of corporate ownership structure in most East Asian countries (Lim, 1981; Claessens 
et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  
In Malaysia, publicly listed firms must make accurate, timely disclosure of material information 
to the investing public under the Companies Act (1965) and the guidelines issued by the Security 
Commission and Bursa Malaysia. The most significant change in the timeliness of corporate 
reporting was brought about by the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) in 2001, which became an integral part of the revamped listing requirements 
of Bursa in that year.2 One of the objectives of MCCG is to identify the optimal framework for 
principles and best practices in corporate governance, including providing investors equal access to 
value relevant corporate information in a timely manner. The implementation and integration of 
MCCG into the Bursa listing requirements in 2001 provide a natural experiment to test whether the 
associated improvement in corporate financial disclosure affects the timeliness of earnings. As the 
implementation of MCCG is exogenous, our tests are not plagued by the perennial endogeneity 
problem in corporate governance studies. We also capitalize on the unique Malaysian institutional 
environment where the existence of political connections remains pronounced (Gomez and Jomo, 
1999; Johnson and Mitton, 2003) by testing whether political connection matters to the timeliness of 
earnings. 
Using fixed-effects panel regressions for a sample of 599 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia from 
1996 to 2009, we find evidence of a non-linear relationship between concentrated ownership, 
measured by the largest shareholding in a firm, and the reporting lag but not the timeliness of price 
                                                          
2 Bursa Malaysia notes that “Timely disclosure of material information is critical for building and maintaining corporate 
credibility and investor confidence” (http://www.bursamalaysia.com/misc/system/assets/2349/rules_lr_guides_CDBP 
-final2012.pdf). Paragraph 9.22 of the revamped listing rules mandates all listed firms to submit their interim quarterly 
reports to Bursa no later than two months after the end of each quarter of the financial year, and paragraph 9.23 requires 
all listed firms to announce to Bursa its annual audited financial statement together with the auditors’ and directors’ 
reports within four months after the fiscal year end, followed by the submission of its annual audited financial statement 
together with the auditors’ and directors’ reports to Bursa and shareholders no later than six months after the fiscal year 
end (Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad, 2013). 
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discovery. We further examine whether these relationships are driven by the identity of the largest 
shareholder. Our data source permits the following five groups of largest shareholders to be 
identified: individuals/families; foreigners; financial institutions; state/government; and others, 
consisting of mutual funds/nominees/trusts/trustees, industrial companies, and foundations. 
Results show firms with government as the largest shareholder have a substantially shorter reporting 
lag and timelier price discovery, contrary to the commonly held view that government-owned firms 
adopt a more opaque information environment in order to cover up their inefficiency (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997) and perverse actions of favoring certain parties and expropriating rents from minority 
shareholders (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Cheng and Courtenay (2006) also find government-owned 
firms in Singapore are associated with greater transparency, in line with the government’s support 
for better disclosure policies.  
Although the identity of other largest shareholder groups does not seem to matter to the 
reporting lag, we find they are significant in explaining the timeliness of price discovery. As 
expected, family firms are significantly less timely in price discovery, consistent with these firms 
preferring a more opaque environment possibly to conceal their ill-gained benefits. So are foreign-
owned firms, although this result is contrary to our expectation. We also find the presence of other 
substantial shareholders in the firm exacerbates the adverse effect on corporate transparency by the 
largest shareholder. Therefore, the presence of other substantial shareholders does not alleviate 
agency problems within the firm. 
As expected, the reporting lag is shorter in the post-MCCG period, suggesting an 
improvement in corporate financial disclosure and reporting. However the impact of the 
implementation of MCCG on the timeliness of price discovery is mostly immaterial. Partitioning our 
sample into the pre- and post-MCCG periods, we report much stronger results in the pre-MCCG 
period due primarily to the greater variation in financial reporting during this relatively less regulated 
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regime. Finally, we find firms with political connection take a significantly shorter time (about five 
days shorter) to release their financial reports but have a less timely price discovery than non-
connected firms. 
Price discovery is the dynamic process by which new information is incorporated into market 
prices. Consequently, knowledge about the price discovery process and the speed at which this 
process occurs are relevant to market design, the nature of information channels/flow, and 
informed trading. Our study furthers our understanding of the price discovery process and 
contributes to the literature3 by providing the first evidence that corporate ownership and identity of 
the largest shareholder are important determinants of the timeliness of price discovery. Our finding 
that the identity of the largest owners matters more to the timeliness of earnings than their fractional 
shareholding has important implications for many countries in the neighboring region where 
concentrated ownership and strong government intervention are salient features of the capital 
markets.  
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our predictions, 
followed by data and research method in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and 
section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Testable predictions 
 Modern day corporations are commonly perceived to have widely dispersed ownership and a 
separation of ownership and control, with control delegated to professional managers. The key issue 
in this situation is to ensure that managers act in the best interest of the shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, in reality, in all but a few developed countries, most publicly listed firms 
are closely held, with the controlling shareholder playing an active role in running the firm and often 
                                                          
3 Refer to Brown et al. (2011) for a review of past studies on the timeliness of price discovery of corporate earnings. 
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serving as the chief executive officer or chairman of the board with decisive vote in major corporate 
decisions (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001). This ownership concentration and structure is 
indeed a salient feature of Malaysian firms (Claessens et al., 2000).  
We predict an inverse U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and the 
timeliness of earnings, consistent with the alignment hypothesis dominating at low levels of 
ownership and the entrenchment hypothesis dominating at high levels of ownership. That is, at low 
levels of ownership, increased ownership in the hands of a few substantial shareholders makes it 
more cost effective to monitor managerial disclosure decisions and thus reduce agency costs 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). To reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, 
controlling shareholders may improve transparency either thorough increased public disclosure or 
private communication. The monitoring role of large shareholders has support in Yeo et al. (2002) 
who document a strong positive relationship between external unrelated blockholdings and earnings 
informativeness. The alignment hypothesis thus predicts a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and earnings timeliness.  
At high levels of ownership, however, the entrenchment hypothesis suggests that concentrated 
ownership provides incentives to extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Morck, 1996). In this setting, controlling shareholders have both the incentive and 
opportunity to adversely affect accounting information and reporting, thus giving them more 
freedom to pursue their personal agendas. Indeed, Fan and Wong (2002) find concentrated 
ownership in seven East Asian economies is associated with lower earnings informativeness, 
consistent with substantial shareholders trying to conceal their expropriation activities and avoid 
outside monitoring. Similarly, Chin et al. (2006) find firms with concentrated ownership in Taiwan 
issue less accurate and more optimistically biased earnings forecasts. Evidence consistent with the 
proposition that controlling shareholders engage more in earnings management to hide their 
  
6 
 
opportunistic behavior and avoid adverse consequences such as disciplinary action is documented in 
South Korea (Kim and Yi, 2006), India (Sarkar et al., 2008), and China (Liu and Lu, 2007). The 
entrenchment hypothesis thus predicts a negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
the timeliness of earnings. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1: The relationship between ownership concentration and the timeliness of earnings is inverse U-shaped. 
 Non-linearity has been documented in past studies including Gul et al. (2010). They show that 
stock price synchronicity, which proxies for the amount of firm-specific information incorporated 
into the stock price of Chinese-listed firms, is a concave function of the largest percentage 
shareholding with an inflexion point at approximately 50%.  
We also examine the identity of large shareholders since they are likely to differ in their 
corporate objectives, power, and access to financing. We hypothesize that the timeliness of earnings 
varies according to who the largest shareholder is.  
Family firms, which are prevalent in Malaysia (Lim, 1981; Claessens et al., 2000), are a unique 
class of shareholders that hold poorly diversified investment portfolios long-term (multiple 
generations), have greater reputation concerns, and control senior management positions (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003).  We thus expect family firms to have greater incentives to protect their wealth as it 
is tied directly to the welfare of the company. By adopting a better corporate disclosure framework, 
for example, the increased transparency facilitates external capital raising by family firms. Under this 
view, family firms are thus expected to have greater timeliness of earnings.   
However, the literature also draws attention to the entrenchment effect, which may be more 
prominent in family firms (Claessens et al., 2002). Specifically, family members have greater 
attachment to control and are more likely to pursue private benefits of control at the expense of 
outside shareholders (Hagelin et al., 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2010). This is supported by the fact 
that family owners often have significant businesses outside the firm, which provide them with a 
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means to divert the firm’s resources (Atanasov et al., 2008). Therefore, family-owned firms are likely 
to prefer a more opaque information environment to deliberately defraud minority shareholders, 
thus compromising the timeliness of earnings. As the earnings timeliness of family firms is an 
empirical one, we do not predict a sign for this relationship: 
H2: There is a relationship between family firms and the timeliness of earnings. 
Evidence on the information environment of family firms is mixed. Fan and Wong (2002) find 
lower earnings quality in family firms in seven East Asian economies. Similarly, Yeo et al. (2002) 
report earnings informativeness decreases with management ownership of family firms. In contrast, 
Wan-Hussin (2009) finds enhanced segment disclosures by family firms in Malaysia, in consonance 
with Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006), who report that family firms are associated with better quality 
reported earnings and greater earnings informativeness, have lower abnormal accruals and less 
persistent transitory negative earnings, and are more likely to warn the market for a given magnitude 
of bad news. 
The second group of largest shareholder we examine is foreign investors. The fact that foreign 
investors are geographically separated from the firm can increase information asymmetries and 
complicate managerial monitoring. Therefore, foreign investors may demand higher standards of 
governance and protection of minority rights (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), both formally, through a 
proxy system where they can initiate and vote on proposals, and informally, through negotiations 
with management (Davis and Thompson, 1994). Past studies show that firms with substantial 
foreign shareholders are associated with higher corporate transparency, lower information 
asymmetries (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Jiang and Kim, 2004), greater earnings informativeness (Cho 
and Rui, 2009), and a greater amount of firm-specific information incorporated into stock price (Gul 
et al., 2010). We thus predict the following: 
H3: Foreign-owned firms have greater timeliness of earnings. 
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The third largest shareholder group is financial institutions. These investors have to comply 
with stringent rules and regulations due to their fiduciary responsibilities to their investors (Hawley 
and William, 1997). Institutional investors are usually large in size (Jennings, 2005), suggesting that 
they have the resources (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and expertise to analyze financial information 
(Hand, 1990). The sheer size of corporate ownership of institutional investors enables them to exert 
pressure on the firm to act in the interests of shareholders through the media (Wu, 2004) and by 
withholding a substantial number of votes when they are dissatisfied with management performance 
and the firm’s corporate governance structures (Del Guercio et al., 2008). Their substantial market 
power, influence, and sophistication in gathering and interpreting information about the firm (Grier 
and Zychowicz, 1994; Wahab et al., 2007) suggest that institutional investors have a considerable 
advantage in monitoring corporate activities compared to other investors. 
Indeed, institutional investors often adopt a more active role in corporate governance issues 
(Conover et al., 2008) including disclosure practices. In Malaysia, this is facilitated through the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG), which consists of five founding domestic 
institutional shareholders.4 MSWG aims at protecting the interest of minority shareholders through 
shareholders activism and acts as an independent research organization to advise and encourage 
good governance practices amongst publicly listed firms (MSWG, 2010). Specifically, MSWG aims 
to harness the monitoring strength of institutional investors to monitor and institute changes in the 
firm they own a stake in (MCCG, part 4, paragraph 4.80).  
Past studies show that institutional investors reduce the incidence of earnings management 
(Chung et al., 2002; Koh, 2003). The effectiveness of institutional investors as a monitoring body 
has also been recognized by governments that incorporate institutional monitoring duties into 
                                                          
4 The five founding domestic institutional shareholders are Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB); Employee Provident 
Fund (EPF); Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT); Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH); and National Social Security 
Organization of Malaysia (SOCSO). 
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regulations in order to ensure adequate oversight (Starks, 2000). Sarkar et al. (2008) show that 
domestic institutional owners mitigate earnings management and act as a compensating control 
mechanism for the presence of controlling shareholders on corporate boards in Indian firms. We 
therefore argue that financial institutions are able to mitigate information asymmetry by pressuring 
firms to disclose information in a timelier manner. This in turn implies that having an institutional 
investor as the largest substantial shareholder increases the timeliness of earnings. 
H4: Firms with financial institutions as the largest shareholder have greater timeliness of earnings. 
Finally, we capitalize on the unique political economy of Malaysia by examining the timeliness 
of a group of firms that have the Malaysian government (e.g., Ministry of Finance) as their largest 
shareholder. Government as the largest shareholder usually lacks the necessary incentive to engage 
in effective monitoring since their actions are equally driven by political expediency (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994) and the economics of the situation. Firms may also be incentivized to act in the 
interest of powerful government-owners at the expense of minority shareholders in return for 
special treatments.5 Indeed, Choy et al. (2011) argue that government involvement in the economy 
and financial system creates agency problems because governments can use their ownership or 
influence and control to favor certain parties and expropriate rents from minority shareholders. This 
relationship-based system fosters a protective shield from scrutiny of any action made (Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003), suggesting that firms with dominant government ownership are less exposed to the 
discipline of the market for corporate control, or to shareholders who coalesce into large blocks in 
order to effect an organizational change. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also argue that the behavior of 
                                                          
5 Special treatments include easier access to “soft” and more loans (Backman, 1999); lighter taxation (De Soto, 1989); 
securing business contracts (Johnson and Mitton, 2003); opportunities to buy assets that are privatized (Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003); access to subsidies and funding priorities (Gul, 2006); bailout preferential (Faccio et al., 2006); relaxed 
regulatory oversight on the firm (Stigler, 1971); and increased hurdles for new entrants or competitors (Choy et al., 
2011). 
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government-owned firms is inconsistent with the justification of their efficiency and has resulted in 
huge losses that drain the country’s treasuries (Kikeri et al., 1992; Boycko et al., 1995).  
Therefore, we expect the information environment of government-owned firms is more 
opaque so as to cover up their inefficiency and perverse actions of favoring certain parties and 
expropriating rents from minority shareholders (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). This has support in Gul 
et al. (2010) who document that Chinese-listed firms with government as the largest shareholder 
have less firm-specific information incorporated into their stock price. We thus predict the 
timeliness of earnings of government-owned firms is lower: 
H5: State/government-owned firms have lower timeliness of earnings. 
Controlling shareholders are more likely to expropriate minority shareholders when there are 
limited incentives and opportunities for rivals to contest control. The ability of other substantial 
shareholders to form coalitions and oppose opportunistic controlling shareholders suggests that the 
presence of other substantial shareholders in the firm moderates the adverse effect on corporate 
transparency by the largest controlling shareholder. All else equal, we predict greater earnings 
timeliness in firms that have other substantial shareholders:  
H6: The higher the concentration of shares held by substantial shareholders other than the largest 
shareholder, the greater the timeliness of earnings. 
The Asian financial crisis serves as a reminder for firms of the importance of having a sound 
corporate governance system. One of the fundamental objectives of good corporate governance is 
to reduce information asymmetry through timelier disclosure of financial information. In Malaysia, 
the development of corporate disclosure and transparency began in 1996 following the shift from a 
merit-based regulation, which emphasizes the regulatory assessment of the quality of an issuance of 
securities, to a disclosure-based regulation, which emphasizes the importance of the quality and 
timeliness of material information disclosed by firms to the public (Securities Commission Malaysia, 
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1998). This is reinforced by MCCG whose objectives are to identify the optimal framework for 
principles and best practices in corporate governance, and ultimately allowing all shareholders and 
the public access to quality and reliable information in a timely manner. Of particular significance in 
this move towards timelier corporate financial disclosure is the integration of MCCG into the 
revamped listing requirements of Bursa in January 2001. We thus predict:  
H7: The timeliness of earnings is greater in the post-MCCG period. 
 
3. Data and Research Method 
Our initial sample consists of panel data of 1,276 firms listed on the Malaysian Main Board 
from 1996 to 2009. Ownership data on the top 20 shareholders from 1996 to 2000, and the top 30 
shareholders from 2001 onwards6 are retrieved from Bursa Malaysia’s “End of Year Shareholdings 
by Name” database. For each firm, we hand-collect the fraction of outstanding shares held by 
substantial shareholders, defined as shareholders with shareholdings of at least five percent. Our 
data source allows us to identify and classify the largest substantial shareholders into the following 
five main groups: (i) individuals/families; (ii) foreigners; (iii) financial institutions (e.g., Employees 
Provident Fund, Maybank, and other financial companies); (iv) state/government;7 and (v) others, 
consisting of mutual funds/nominees/trusts/trustees, industrial companies, and foundations. In our 
tests, the last group of largest owners (“others”) forms the base case.  
We remove financial firms from our sample and firm-years for which we cannot find the 
financial report announcement date. To be included in the final sample, firms are also required to 
                                                          
6 The change in the reporting of ownership data for the top 20 shareholders to the top 30 shareholders in the annual 
reports is one of the consequences of the implementation of MCCG subsequent to the Asian financial crisis. This 
change is not likely to significantly affect our results as we focus on the largest and second largest shareholders, and all 
shareholdings of at least 5%. 
7 Following Saleh et al. (2009), government/state ownership is measured by the percentage of ownership by the 
Malaysian government institutions, agencies and government linked companies (GLCs). A list of GLCs was obtained 
from the Khazanah Nasional Berhad’s website. Examples of the largest shareholder belonging to government/state 
include the Ministry of Finance and the Selangor State Government.  
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have financial data including daily closing stock prices, annual earnings per share, market 
capitalization, leverage, and book to market value. Fiscal year end dates, financial report 
announcement dates, and daily closing stock prices are retrieved from the Bloomberg’s financial 
database. Other financial data are sourced from the Worldscope database. After eliminating the 1% 
and 99% percentiles,8 our final sample consists of 2,882 firm-year observations for 599 Malaysian 
firms.  
We employ two measures of timeliness. The first is based on the method in Beekes and 
Brown (2006) which captures the speed of price discovery of corporate earnings throughout the 
fiscal year leading up to the release of the final quarter unaudited interim report.9 Specifically, it 
measures how fast a firm’s financial information is reflected in its stock price and how accurately a 
firm’s stock price approximates the market’s valuation 14 days after the release of the final quarter 
interim report:10  
                (1) 
 
where tP  is the closing stock price and tI  is the market index, both on day t.    is the closing stock 
price 14 days after the earnings release date. The smaller the value of Timeliness, the quicker is the 
price discovery, i.e., financial information is reflected in the firm’s stock price in a timelier manner. 
To cater for the adverse impact of stock price volatility on the timeliness measure, we deflate it by 
one plus the absolute value of the market-adjusted return over the 365 trading day period, as 
recommended by Beekes and Brown (2006).  
                                                          
8 We remove the outliers to ensure that the regression parameters are unbiased and the results are not driven by a few 
outliers. Removing the outliers allows us to show the effect on the “average” firm.  
9 We use the unaudited interim reports because these are the reports that are first released to the public. Audited reports 
are typically released two months after.  
10 We choose 14 days so as to allow the market to fully adjust to the financial information. 
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Our second timeliness measure is the reporting lag, which was first examined by Dyer and 
McHugh (1975). It is defined as the number of calendar days from the fiscal year end to the release 
date of the final quarter unaudited interim report.  
We employ the fixed-effects panel regression model clustered at the firm level to estimate the 
relationship between the independent variables and our timeliness measures.11 Our model 
specification is as follows:  
Timelinessit (Reporting Lagit) = α + β1Largest Shareholdingit+ β2Largest Shareholdingit^2 
+ β3Owner Typeit+ β4Other Ownersit + β5Post-MCCG + β6Politicalit + β7Sizeit  
+ β8Leverageit + β9Bad Newsit + β10Book-to-Mktit + β11Volatilityit 
+ Industryi + eit ,                (2) 
where ownership concentration is proxied by Largest Shareholding, the fractional ownership of the 
largest substantial shareholder.12 The squared term (Largest Shareholding^2) is included to capture 
non-linearity in the relationship between timeliness and ownership concentration. Owner Type is a 
vector of the largest shareholder identity groups: Family, Foreign, Institution, and Government, which 
respectively take a value of 1 if the largest shareholder is a family, foreigner, financial institution, or 
the Malaysian government, and 0 otherwise. As an alternative to the dummy variable, we also use 
the fractional ownership of each of these largest shareholder groups (Family Ownership, Foreign 
Ownership, Institution Ownership, and Government Ownership) in our regressions.  
Other Owners is a Herfindahl-type index that measures the concentration of shares held by 
substantial shareholders excluding the largest one. Following Liu and Lu (2007), it is the sum of the 
                                                          
11 Fixed-effects panel data techniques control for endogeneity due to unobserved sources of firm heterogeneity that are 
time invariant.  
12 We also measure ownership concentration by the sum of all shareholdings in excess of 5 percent, i.e., percentage block 
holdings. The correlation between this measure and Largest Shareholding is close to 0.7. Not surprisingly, the results 
(untabulated) are almost identical to those reported in this paper and are available upon request.  
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squared percentage shareholding of each substantial shareholder, excluding the controlling 
shareholder: 
(3) 
 
where Si is the number of shares held by the i
th largest substantial shareholder; S is the total number 
of shares outstanding; and n is the number of other substantial shareholders. A low index value 
implies that other substantial shareholders pose less of a challenge to the controlling shareholder.  
The implementation of MCCG as an integral part of the revamped Bursa listing requirements 
in 2001 marked a significant shift in the governance system, particularly with respect to corporate 
financial reporting and disclosure in Malaysia. Since the change took effect from the 2002 fiscal year 
onwards, we use 2002 as the cutoff year. In the equation, Post-MCCG is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for the post-2002 period, and 0 otherwise.  
A number of control variables that may influence the timeliness of earnings are included in 
the tests so that our regression results are unbiased. The unique feature of the Malaysian political 
economy suggests that we should control for whether the firm has political connections. Frye and 
Shleifer (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (1998) posit that politicians’ “helping hand” may become a 
“grabbing hand” when expropriation of minority shareholders occurs. They find that resources are 
tunneled away from listed firms to the state/government to serve social objectives as well as giving 
bribes, providing vote-buying during election years, and for unnecessary employment in 
economically depressed states. Bliss and Gul (2012a, b) document that politically-connected firms in 
Malaysia have higher risk, lower returns on assets, and are more likely to report a loss and negative 
equity than non-connected firms. We therefore expect lower timeliness of earnings for politically-
connected firms as they would prefer a more opaque information environment to conceal potential 
expropriations. Politically-connected firms (Political) are identified using the lists obtained from 
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Gomez and Jomo (1999), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Faccio (2006), Wahab et al. (2007), and Bliss 
et al. (2008). They define politically-connected firms as firms whose directors or managers have 
relationships with Malaysian ministers or army officers.  
We also control for firm size (Size) since larger firms have a richer information environment 
(Bushman et al., 2004) and a better equipped accounting system to ensure timely financial 
information disclosure (Givoly and Palmon, 1982). Larger firms also have the financial resources to 
expedite the audit process (Courteau and Zeghal, 1999). Beekes and Brown (2006) and Beekes et al. 
(2006) find larger firms are timelier in their price discovery. Firm size is proxied by the firm’s natural 
log of market capitalization. 
We control for leverage (Leverage) since highly leveraged firms are expected to be associated 
with greater and timelier disclosure in order to meet their creditors’ demand (Abdulla, 1996). 
However, the evidence in Conover et al. (2008) suggests that highly levered firms tend to be more 
closely monitored by their bankers who can access corporate information prior to it being publicly 
disseminated. The relationship between leverage and the timeliness of earnings is therefore an 
empirical one. Leverage is measured by total debt divided by total assets. 
Past studies show that firms with poor performance are more likely to delay the disclosure of 
negative financial information in an attempt to delay a drastic fall in stock price (Haw et al., 2000). 
Conversely, firms with above average performance may want to disclose good news earlier perhaps 
to raise capital on the best available funding terms and conditions (Foster, 1986). Managers of these 
firms may also want to disclose the information earlier for personal gains such as the continuation of 
their positions and compensation justification (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Bad News takes the value 1 
if the change in annual earnings per share is negative, and zero otherwise. We also control for 
growth (Book-to-Mkt) and idiosyncratic risk (Volatility); the latter is measured by the standard 
deviation of daily returns over the same window as Timeliness.  
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In Malaysia, firms in the mining (Mining), plantation and timber (Plantation), and infrastructure 
project (IPC) industries are subject to more stringent disclosure requirements than other firms 
(Bursa Listing Requirement, Section 9, Part M).13 We therefore include indicators to control for 
these industries in the tests. In the equation with Timeliness as the dependent variable, we also control 
for Reporting Lag since firms with a shorter reporting lag are expected to have timelier price 
discovery. 
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that it takes an average (median) of 59 (57) days for our 
sample firms to release their (unaudited) financial report since their fiscal year end (Reporting Lag). 
The average (median) Timeliness is 0.173 (0.158), with a standard deviation of 0.114.  
The average (median) Largest Shareholding of our sample firms is 30.5 (26.6) percent, similar to 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). Family-owned firms tend to dominate, with 12 percent of firms having 
family as the largest shareholder, followed closely by foreign-owned firms at 11.8 percent. As the 
largest shareholder, Government has the highest average (maximum) shareholding at 41.6 (82.5) 
percent, followed by Foreign at 37.0 (75.6) percent, Family at 22.7 (73.5) percent, and Institution at 21.8 
(74.5) percent. 
About one in every ten firms in our sample is politically connected (Political). The low mean 
and median of Other Owners suggests that other substantial shareholders pose less of a challenge to 
the controlling shareholder in our sample. The average (median) firm has RM 1.36 billion (RM 203 
million) in market capitalization, a leverage ratio of 0.232 (0.218), and a book to market ratio of 
1.231 (0.781). The average (median) volatility is 33.4 (33.2) percent per year. Slightly more than half 
the sample firms experience a drop in earnings (Bad News) during our study period. 
                                                          
13 Bursa Listing Requirement, section 9, Part M, Paragraph 9.36 requires all listed firms in the mining (Mining) and 
plantation and timber (Plantation) industries to immediately announce their production figures for each month no later 
than the end of the subsequent month. Likewise, Paragraph 9.38 requires all infrastructure project firms (IPC) to 
announce quarterly progress reports on infrastructure projects no later than two months after the end of each quarter of 
the financial year (Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad, 2009). 
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4. Results 
4.1 Univariate  
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of the continuous variables. As expected, both the 
timeliness measures are positively correlated. Largest Shareholding is negatively correlated with 
Reporting Lag and Timeliness, suggesting that there is greater timeliness of earnings for firms whose 
largest shareholder holds a larger stake in the firm. This provides some preliminary support for the 
alignment hypothesis. Firms with a higher family ownership are associated with lower earnings 
timeliness, measured by either the reporting lag or the speed of price discovery. The reverse is 
observed for firms with a higher foreign ownership. Although firms with a higher government 
shareholding have a longer reporting lag, they are timelier in price discovery. In contrast, firms with 
a higher institutional ownership have a shorter reporting lag but a lower timeliness of price 
discovery. The correlation between the independent variables is low, suggesting that multicolinearity 
is unlikely to be a major problem in our regressions. 
Table 3 reports the results from univariate tests of differences in Reporting Lag (Panel A) and 
Timeliness of price discovery of earnings (Panel B) between different levels of ownership 
concentration and identity groups. P-values for both t-test and Mann-Whitney test are reported. 
Results show that firms with “high” concentrated ownership, using the median Largest Shareholding as 
the cutoff, on average have a significantly longer reporting lag by two days and are significantly less 
timely in price discovery (by 0.014). Although the reporting lag is significantly shorter for foreign-
owned firms (an average of 2.5 days shorter than domestically owned firms), it is significantly much 
longer (an average of five days longer) for firms that have government as the largest shareholder. 
For these two groups of firms, the speed of price discovery is not significantly different from that of 
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the others. There is some evidence that firms with a higher family shareholding are less timely in 
price discovery.  
Finally, we test whether our timeliness measures are related to changes in corporate 
governance, particularly in relation to corporate disclosure of financial information, brought about 
by the integration of MCCG into the revamped Bursa listing rules. Results show the average 
(median) Reporting Lag has significantly decreased from 62 (59) days to 59 (57) since the 
implementation of MCCG in 2001. Over the same time period, the average (median) Timeliness 
metric has also significantly decreased from 0.243 (0.232) days to 0.158 (0.149). Therefore, it appears 
that the timeliness of earnings, both in its reporting lag and speed of price discovery, have improved 
as a consequence of MCCG. 
 
4.2 Multivariate  
To test the hypotheses in a multivariate setting, we run fixed-effects panel regressions with 
clustered standard errors for both measures of earnings timeliness. The results are reported in Tables 
4 (Reporting Lag) and 5 (Timeliness). In both tables, Panel A reports the result for the full period, Panel 
B the pre-MCCG period, and Panel C the post-MCCG period. The results are generally robust 
across the three panels, with those for the pre-MCCG period being the strongest. This is due 
primarily to the greater variation in corporate governance and reporting policy during the relatively 
less regulated period. 
Table 4 shows that Largest Shareholding has a positive coefficient in specification (3), although 
marginally at 10.6 percent, suggesting that firms with a higher ownership concentration are slower in 
releasing their financial report during the less regulated pre-MCCG period. For every one percentage 
point increase in Largest Shareholding, the Reporting Lag increases by nearly one day. This finding 
supports the entrenchment effect and past evidence (e.g., Fan and Wong, 2002; Chin et al., 2006) 
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that concentrated owners are more able to conceal their rent seeking activities by delaying financial 
disclosure in the pre-MCCG period. There is also evidence of a curvilinear relationship between the 
largest shareholding and the reporting lag, as indicated by the significantly negative coefficient on 
Largest Shareholding^2 in the pre-MCCG period (specifications (3) and (4)).  
Firms that have government as the largest shareholder release their financial report about four 
days earlier on average, as indicated by the negative coefficient on Government (specification (3)). The 
result is statistically significant only in the pre-MCCG period. The same is observed in specification 
(4) when we use the fractional government ownership (Government Ownership). The other identity 
groups of largest shareholders, i.e., Family, Foreign, and Institution, and their respective shareholdings 
are immaterial to the reporting lag. Neither is the presence of other substantial shareholders (Other 
Owners) in the firm.  
Interestingly, we find political connection is highly significant in explaining the reporting lag. 
The timely disclosure of financial information, as mandated by MCCG, appears to have the greatest 
impact on connected firms, which take a significantly shorter time (about five days shorter) to 
release their financial reports than non-connected firms in the post-MCCG period. The Post-MCCG 
variable itself is significantly negative, showing that the objective of MCCG in enabling all 
shareholders and the public equal access to financial information in a timely manner is somehow 
met. 
Of the control variables, only Volatility, Leverage, Bad News, and Book-to-Mkt have some 
explanatory power in explaining the reporting lag. While highly volatile firms have a shorter 
reporting lag, those with high leverage and book-to-market are more sluggish in their financial 
reporting. As expected, the release of bad news is more likely to be delayed (by three days on 
average) particularly in the pre-MCCG period.  
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The results are roughly similar but more significant when we measure timeliness by the speed 
of price discovery in Table 5, with a few exceptions. First, although ownership concentration is 
significant in explaining Reporting Lag, it is not in explaining Timeliness. However, the identity and 
shareholding of the largest owner do a much better job in explaining the timeliness of price 
discovery than the reporting lag. In the pre-MCCG period, family firms are on average half a 
standard deviation less timely in their price discovery, as shown in specification (3). This suggests 
that family firms are more able to conceal their rent seeking activities in the relatively less regulated 
pre-MCCG period.  
Both Foreign and Foreign Ownership (specification (3) and (4) respectively) have a significantly 
positive coefficient in the pre-MCCG period. Specifically, foreign-owned firms are about one 
standard deviation less timely in their price discovery, contrary to expectations. In the post-MCCG 
period, however, the timeliness of foreign-owned firms is insignicantly different from other firms. 
Specifications (3) and (4) show government-owned firms are particularly more timely in price 
discovery (on average about one standard deviation timelier), contrary to our prediction. Together 
with Table 4, our results therefore show that government-owned firms are quicker in releasing their 
financial reports and have a timelier price discovery process. This result is consistent with the 
Singaporean evidence that government-owned firms are more transparent, reflecting the 
government’s support for better disclosure policies (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). We do not find 
firms owned by financial institutions are more timely in their price discovery, in line with the results 
of Wan-Hussin (2009) that institutional investors do not necessarily promote corporate 
transparency.  
While the presence of other substantial shareholders (Other Owners) does not matter to 
Reporting Lag (Table 4), Table 5 shows that it matters to Timeliness. Contrary to prediction, however, 
we find the presence of other substantial shareholders in the firm exacerbates the adverse effect on 
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corporate transparency by the largest controlling shareholder. Our results thus suggest that the 
presence of other substantial shareholders does not alleviate agency problems, possibly because they 
just do not have enough decisive votes to counteract the self-serving actions of the largest owner.  
While politically connected firms have a shorter reporting lag, they have less timely price 
discovery (albeit not economically significant). In line with the MCCG mandate of timely financial 
reporting, firms are quicker in releasing their (unaudited) financial statements. However, the 
corporate governance reform has not resulted in a corresponding improvement in the timeliness of 
price discovery of earnings. As expected, firms with a shorter reporting lag have timelier price 
discovery in the pre-MCCG period; however, this relationship is economically weak. Therefore, this 
evidence overwhelmingly shows that earlier earnings reporting does not on average materially 
improve the timeliness of price discovery.  
 
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
Timely corporate disclosure has long been recognized as an important element of making 
financial information useful before it loses its ability to influence decision making. The fact that large 
shareholders and managers can exercise control over a firm’s operation, including its financial 
information disclosure, motivates us to examine the link between the timeliness of earnings and 
corporate ownership. We conduct our research in Malaysia due mainly to the unique political 
economy where government has a significant influence on the corporate sector, and in particular the 
highly concentrated corporate ownership. 
Our study uses fixed-effects panel regressions with clustered standard errors on a sample of 
599 firms listed on the Malaysian Main Board over a 14-year period (1996 to 2009). We find 
evidence of a non-linear relationship between the largest shareholding and the reporting lag in the 
pre-MCCG period. We explore this relationship further by examining who these largest substantial 
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shareholders are and whether their identity can shed further light on the relationship between 
earnings timeliness and ownership concentration.  
Our results show that the identity of the largest shareholder and her fractional shareholding do 
a better job in explaining the timeliness of price discovery than in explaining the reporting lag. The 
results are generally more significant in the less regulated pre-MCCG period. In particular, firms 
with government as the largest shareholder have a substantially shorter reporting lag and timelier 
price discovery in the pre-MCCG period. This finding therefore provides a rationale for 
governments to play a larger role in corporate disclosure. Although the other identity groups do not 
seem important in explaining the reporting lag, they are significant in explaining the timeliness of 
price discovery. As expected, family firms have lower timeliness of price discovery of earnings, 
consistent with these firms having an opaque information environment, as do foreign-owned firms. 
Government-owned firms are in fact more timely as a result of the government’s commitment 
towards higher transparency and better corporate governance. The timeliness of price discovery is 
greater, but only marginally, in the post-MCCG period when all shareholders and the public have 
access to quality and reliable information in a timelier manner.  
After nearly three decades since the first ownership study in Malaysia by Lim (1981), our study 
reveals that the ownership structure of Malaysian firms remains highly concentrated, especially in the 
hands of families and increasingly foreigners in recent periods. Our finding that timelier corporate 
reporting, brought about by the integration of MCCG into the Bursa listing rules, does not 
materially improve the timeliness of price discovery has implications for many regulatory agencies 
and listing authorities around the world which mandate requirements and recommendations 
regarding timely disclosure of financial information. Our finding that the identity rather than the 
fractional shareholding of the controlling owners matters more to the timeliness of earnings has 
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important implications for many countries in the neighboring region where concentrated ownership 
and strong government intervention are salient features of the capital markets.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Timeliness is the Beekes and Brown’s (2006) measure of timeliness of price discovery of earnings deflated by one plus the 
absolute value of the market-adjusted return over the 365 trading day period. Reporting Lag is the number of calendar 
days from the fiscal year end to the release date of the final quarter unaudited interim report. Largest Shareholding is the 
fractional ownership of the largest owner. Family, Foreign, Institution, and Government respectively equal 1 if the largest 
shareholder is a family, foreigner, financial institution or government, and 0 otherwise. Family Ownership, Foreign 
Ownership, Institution Ownership, and Government Ownership are respectively the fractional ownership of the largest 
shareholder represented by Family, Foreign, Institution, and Government. Other Owners is the Herfindahl-type index that 
measures the concentration of shares held by all substantial shareholders except the largest one. Political equals 1 for 
politically connected firms and 0 otherwise. Volatility is standard deviation of daily returns over the same window as 
Timeliness; Size is market capitalization (in RM million); Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Bad News takes a value 
of 1 if the change in annual earnings is negative, 0 otherwise; and Book-to-Mkt is the year end market price divided by 
book value per share.  
Test Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Dependent Variable
Reporting Lag 59.180 57.000 13.363 14.000 151.000
Timeliness 0.173 0.158 0.114 0.000 0.827
Panel B: Independent Variables
Largest Shareholding 0.305 0.266 0.166 0.052 0.868
Family 0.120 0.000 0.325 0.000 1.000
Foreigner 0.118 0.000 0.322 0.000 1.000
Institution 0.052 0.000 0.222 0.000 1.000
Government 0.032 0.000 0.177 0.000 1.000
Family Ownership 0.227 0.212 0.120 0.055 0.735
Foreigner Ownership 0.370 0.375 0.189 0.055 0.756
Institution Ownership 0.218 0.149 0.169 0.058 0.745
Government Ownership 0.416 0.433 0.175 0.056 0.825
Other Owners 0.023 0.018 0.022 0.000 0.284
Panel C: Control Variables
Political 0.122 0.000 0.327 0.000 1.000
Volatility 33.435 33.212 9.959 9.355 67.473
Size 1360.000 203.000 4350.000 2.909 44600.000
Leverage 0.232 0.218 0.167 0.001 0.835
Bad News 0.522 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Book-to-Mkt 1.231 0.781 2.087 0.087 34.050
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Table 2 
 Correlations  
Timeliness is the Beekes and Brown’s (2006) measure of timeliness of price discovery of earnings deflated by one plus the absolute value of the market-adjusted return over the 
365 trading day period. Reporting Lag is the number of calendar days from the fiscal year end to the release date of the final quarter unaudited interim report. Largest 
Shareholding is the fractional ownership of the largest owner. Family, Foreign, Institution, and Government respectively equal 1 if the largest shareholder is a family, foreigner, 
financial institution or government, and 0 otherwise. Family Ownership, Foreign Ownership, Institution Ownership, and Government Ownership are respectively the fractional ownership 
of the largest shareholder represented by Family, Foreign, Institution, and Government. Other Owners is the Herfindahl-type index that measures the concentration of shares held by 
all substantial shareholders except the largest one. Political equals 1 for politically connected firms and 0 otherwise. Volatility is standard deviation of daily returns over the 
same window as Timeliness; Size is natural log of market capitalization; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Bad News takes a value of 1 if the change in annual earnings 
is negative, 0 otherwise; and Book-to-Mkt is the year end market price divided by book value per share. * and ** denote significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Timeliness
Reporting 
Lag
Largest 
Shareholding
Family  
Ownership
Foreign   
Ownership
Institution    
Ownership
Government 
Ownership
Other 
Owners
Volatility Size Leverage
Reporting Lag 0.045
Largest Shareholding -0.085 -0.091
Family Ownership 0.020 0.002 -0.029
Foreign Ownership -0.034 -0.091 0.312
**
-0.103
*
Institution Ownership 0.014 -0.011 0.047 -0.059 -0.059
Government Ownership -0.022 0.052 0.186
**
-0.054 -0.054 -0.031
Other Owners 0.022 0.009 -0.108
**
0.041 -0.010 -0.059 -0.040
Volatility 0.237
*
0.067 -0.279
**
0.015 -0.183
*
-0.006 -0.035 -0.063
Size -0.024 -0.089 0.172
**
-0.086 0.036 -0.021 -0.040 0.036 -0.243
*
Leverage 0.031 0.061 -0.119
**
-0.089 -0.035 0.027 -0.043 -0.016 0.160
*
0.081
Book-to-Mkt -0.028 -0.050 0.117
*
-0.034 0.264
*
-0.015 -0.046 -0.041 -0.149
*
0.274
*
0.110
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Table 3 
Univariate tests of earnings timeliness  
Reporting Lag (Panel A) is the number of calendar days from the fiscal year end to the release date of the final quarter 
unaudited interim report. Timeliness (Panel B) is the Beekes and Brown’s (2006) measure of timeliness of price discovery of 
earnings deflated by one plus the absolute value of the market-adjusted return over the 365 trading day period. “High” and 
“Low” Largest Shareholding is determined using the median as the cutoff. Family, Foreign, Institution, and Government respectively 
equal 1 if the largest shareholder is a family, foreigner, financial institution or government, and 0 otherwise. P-values for t-test 
of difference in means and Mann-Whitney test for difference in medians are reported in the last two columns. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
 
Mean Median Mean Median t-test Mann-Whitney
Panel A: Reporting Lag
High Largest Shareholding Low Largest Shareholding
60.311 58.000 58.050 57.000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Family=1 Family=0
59.214 57.000 59.176 57.000 0.964 0.719
Foreign=1 Foreign=0
57.089 56.000 59.459 57.000 0.005 *** 0.000 ***
Institution=1 Institution=0
58.234 57.000 59.232 57.000 0.418 0.652
Government=1 Government=0
64.169 58.000 59.013 57.000 0.001 *** 0.002 ***
Pre-MCCG period Post-MCCG period
61.988 59.000 58.575 57.000 0.000
***
0.000
***
Panel B: Timeliness
High Largest Shareholding Low Largest Shareholding
0.180 0.167 0.166 0.148 0.004 *** 0.002 ***
Family=1 Family=0
0.183 0.179 0.172 0.156 0.125 0.019 **
Foreign=1 Foreign=0
0.169 0.147 0.174 0.160 0.539 0.209
Institution=1 Institution=0
0.183 0.173 0.173 0.157 0.342 0.231
Government=1 Government=0
0.162 0.159 0.174 0.158 0.366 0.604
Pre-MCCG period Post-MCCG period
0.243 0.232 0.158 0.149 0.000
***
0.000
***
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Table 4 
Fixed-effects panel regression results for Reporting Lag 
Reporting Lag, the dependent variable, is the number of calendar days from the fiscal year end to the release date of the 
final quarter unaudited interim report. Largest Shareholding is the fractional ownership of the largest owner. Family, Foreign, 
Institution, and Government respectively equal 1 if the largest shareholder is a family, foreigner, financial institution or 
government, and 0 otherwise. Family Ownership, Foreign Ownership, Institution Ownership, and Government Ownership are 
respectively the fractional ownership of the largest shareholder represented by Family, Foreign, Institution, and Government. 
Other Owners is the Herfindahl-type index that measures the concentration of shares held by all substantial shareholders 
except the largest one. Political equals 1 for politically connected firms and 0 otherwise. Post-MCCG equals 1 for the 
period after 2002, and 0 otherwise. Volatility is standard deviation of daily returns over the same window as Timeliness; 
Size is natural log of market capitalization; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Bad News takes a value of 1 if the 
change in annual earnings is negative, 0 otherwise; and Book-to-Mkt is the year end market price divided by book value 
per share. Industry and year dummies are included in the test but are not reported. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Pre-MCCG period Panel C: Post-MCCG period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Largest Shareholding -4.987 -7.200 88.192 77.918 -23.910 -23.744
(0.711) (0.595) (0.106) (0.150) (0.220) (0.236)
Largest Shareholding^2 -12.226 -8.922 -140.362 -140.376 10.405 11.725
(0.428) (0.546) (0.059)
*
(0.054)
* (0.568) (0.505)
Family -0.308 -0.916 1.037
(0.884) (0.968) (0.625)
Foreign 1.106 0.933 -0.820
(0.556) (0.869) (0.655)
Institution 2.204 8.015 -1.774
(0.355) (0.176) (0.474)
Government -7.884 -3.653 -7.615
(0.095)
*
(0.050)
**
(0.336)
Family Ownership -4.459 -129.840 3.623
(0.463) (0.353) (0.617)
Foreign Ownership 0.391 6.466 -1.617
(0.943) (0.711) (0.754)
Institution Ownership 5.484 25.237 -9.255
(0.534) (0.105) (0.471)
Government Ownership -19.313 -13.158 -16.805
(0.074)
*
(0.048)
**
(0.213)
Other Owners -12.204 -13.344 75.509 70.314 -22.836 -21.334
(0.607) (0.572) (0.231) (0.244) (0.215) (0.236)
Political -5.260 -5.253 -5.201 -5.227
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
Post-MCCG -4.935 -4.968
(0.000)
***
(0.000)
***
Panel A: Full sample period
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
 
  
Panel B: Pre-MCCG period Panel C: Post-MCCG period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size -0.351 -0.358 -2.808 -2.756 0.268 0.313
(0.602) (0.598) (0.194) (0.214) (0.758) (0.724)
Volatility -0.284 -0.286 -0.586 -0.560 -0.250 -0.250
(0.001)
***
(0.001)
***
(0.018)
**
(0.021)
**
(0.010)
***
(0.010)
***
Leverage 0.067 0.065 0.116 0.114 0.086 0.087
(0.049) ** (0.059) * (0.373) (0.378) (0.018)
** (0.015) **
Bad News 0.999 1.007 2.718 2.740 0.250 0.248
(0.139) (0.135) (0.058)
* (0.056) * (0.718) (0.720)
Book-to-Mkt 0.542 0.559 0.515 0.495 0.348 0.339
(0.066)
* (0.060) * (0.554) (0.564) (0.459) (0.474)
Constant 85.304 86.051 112.530 115.249 68.484 67.506
(0.000)
***
(0.000)
*** (0.011) ** (0.011) ** (0.000)
***
(0.000)
***
N 2882 2882 559 559 2323 2323
R-Squared 0.030 0.030 0.121 0.131 0.020 0.020
Panel A: Full sample period
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Table 5 
Fixed-effects panel regression results for Timeliness 
Timeliness, the dependent variable, is the Beekes and Brown’s (2006) measure of timeliness of price discovery of earnings 
deflated by one plus the absolute value of the market-adjusted return over the 365 trading day period. Largest Shareholding 
is the fractional ownership of the largest owner. Family, Foreign, Institution, and Government respectively equal 1 if the 
largest shareholder is a family, foreigner, financial institution or government, and 0 otherwise. Family Ownership, Foreign 
Ownership, Institution Ownership, and Government Ownership are respectively the fractional ownership of the largest 
shareholder represented by Family, Foreign, Institution, and Government. Other Owners is the Herfindahl-type index that 
measures the concentration of shares held by all substantial shareholders except the largest one. Political equals 1 for 
politically connected firms and 0 otherwise. Post-MCCG equals 1 for the period after 2002, and 0 otherwise. Reporting Lag 
is the number of calendar days from the fiscal year end to the release date of the final quarter unaudited interim report; 
Size is natural log of market capitalization; Volatility is standard deviation of daily returns over the same window as 
Timeliness; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Bad News takes a value of 1 if the change in annual earnings is 
negative, 0 otherwise; and Book-to-Mkt is the year end market price divided by book value per share. Industry and year 
dummies are included in the test but are not reported. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Largest Shareholding 0.049 0.034 -0.392 -0.236 0.201 0.185
(0.687) (0.782) (0.458) (0.672) (0.111) (0.147)
Largest Shareholding^2 -0.007 2.11E-04 0.352 0.034 -0.131 -0.111
(0.958) (0.999) (0.680) (0.966) (0.355) (0.431)
Family 0.023 0.064 0.022
(0.185) (0.090)
*
(0.251)
Foreign 0.033 0.137 0.016
(0.066)
*
(0.009)
***
(0.279)
Institution 0.010 0.012 0.031
(0.534) (0.767) (0.078)
*
Government -0.031 -0.121 -0.033
(0.103) (0.002)
***
(0.239)
Family Ownership 0.034 0.223 0.011
(0.677) (0.545) (0.897)
Foreign Ownership 0.056 0.334 -0.012
(0.265) (0.032)
**
(0.780)
Institution Ownership 0.008 0.232 0.055
(0.921) (0.277) (0.691)
Government Ownership -0.023 -0.447 -0.006
(0.660) (0.007)
***
(0.932)
Other Owners 0.425 0.433 1.048 1.088 0.474 0.467
(0.056) * (0.052)
*
(0.081)
*
(0.063)
*
(0.027)
** (0.027) **
Political 0.039 0.040 0.033 0.034
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
Post-MCCG -0.069 -0.069
(0.000)
***
(0.000)
***
Panel A: Full sample period Panel B: Pre-MCCG period Panel C: Post-MCCG period
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reporting Lag 2.41E-04 2.50E-04 0.002 0.002 -2.88E-04 -2.85E-04
(0.249) (0.232) (0.015)
**
(0.018)
**
(0.145) (0.150)
Size 0.034 0.034 0.021 0.025 0.037 0.037
(0.000)
***
(0.000)
***
(0.592) (0.527) (0.000)
***
(0.000)
***
Volatility 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.003
(0.000)
***
(0.000)
***
(0.088)
*
(0.094)
*
(0.000)
***
(0.000)
***
Leverage 4.13E-05 4.73E-05 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.902) (0.887) (0.356) (0.300) (0.121) (0.104)
Bad News 0.002 0.002 0.046 0.050 -0.005 -0.005
(0.641) (0.648) (0.031)
** (0.021) ** (0.325) (0.325)
Book-to-Mkt -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004
(0.293) (0.339) (0.952) (0.932) (0.074)
* (0.079) *
Constant -0.574 -0.687 -0.508 -0.581 -0.759 -0.752
(0.000)
***
(0.000)
*** (0.555) (0.500) (0.000)
***
(0.000)
***
N 2378 2378 422 422 1956 1956
R-Squared 0.151 0.149 0.141 0.134 0.068 0.064
Panel A: Full sample period Panel B: Pre-MCCG period Panel C: Post-MCCG period
